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Introduction
This case was the latest in a series of challenges brought under the Human Rights Act 1998 against
compulsory treatment under Part IV of the Mental Health Act 1983. The Court of Appeal again
confirmed the statutory authority to impose treatment for mental disorder, even where the patient
has capacity, although it has left a number of issues still unresolved.
The Facts
The patient, B, had been detained at Broadmoor Hospital under sections 37 and 41 of the Mental
Health Act 1983 (MHA) following his conviction for rape in 1995. He had been diagnosed by his
Responsible Medical Officer (RMO), Dr SS, as suffering from bi-polar affective disorder and, from
the time of his arrival at the hospital in April 1995, had been treated with anti-psychotic
medication. Initially this was Depixol administered by depot injection, but from August 1997 this
had been changed to Risperidone which B took orally and voluntarily. In May 1999 B began a
medication-free trial period, although medication was resumed in February 2000 when his
condition deteriorated. 
In July 2003 a further medication-free period was begun but in July 2004, again following a
perceived deterioration in B’s condition, the RMO decided that medication should be resumed. B
however, who was deemed to have the mental capacity to consent to or refuse treatment, now
refused to undergo the proposed treatment. On 15th July 2004 the RMO sought a second opinion
and obtained the required certificate to allow the imposition of treatment under s.58 MHA. On
19th July B obtained an interim injunction preventing treatment and initiated proceedings against
the RMO and the Second Opinion Appointed Doctor (SOAD) for their decision to medicate him
compulsorily, and against the Secretary of State, claiming that the imposition of treatment under
s.58 MHA, in the face of his capacitated refusal, would infringe his rights under the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
By the time of the hearing, the SOAD’s certificate had almost expired, the RMO had anyway
decided that he no longer wished to proceed with treatment and a further injunction had been
granted. Despite this, B argued that his claim against the Secretary of State should be determined.
In a judgment delivered in January 2005, Silber J refused B’s application, holding that the claim was
1 Saneline helpline volunteer; Sweet & Maxwell prize winner, LLM Mental Health Law Programme 2004–2006,
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academic, but nevertheless addressed all the substantive issues on the claim at some length and held
that s.58 MHA was not incompatible with the ECHR. 
Subsequently, in May 2005, the RMO decided that the circumstances had changed and that
compulsory treatment was warranted. Having obtained the necessary second opinion certificate,
he applied in June to the Administrative Court to discharge the injunction preventing treatment.
In response, B commenced new judicial review proceedings to challenge the legality of treatment.
The case was heard before Charles J who, in his lengthy judgment of September 2005, dismissed
B’s application, declaring that the proposed compulsory treatment would be lawful, and duly
discharged the injunction.
The Court of Appeal was thus effectively required to deal with an appeal against the judgments of
both Silber J and Charles J. 
The Law
The Mental Health Act 1959 had clearly prescribed the conditions under which patients could
formally be detained for observation or treatment but, surprisingly, did not include specific
provisions for compulsory treatment; this was regarded as implicit in the Act. Enactment of the
MHA however, removed any uncertainties and, under Part IV (ss.56–64) brought the compulsory
treatment of detained patients firmly within the statutory framework.
Section 63 MHA provides:
“The consent of a patient shall not be required for any medical treatment given to him for the
mental disorder from which he is suffering, not being treatment falling within section 57 or 58
above, if the treatment is given by or under the direction of the responsible medical officer.”
The special safeguards of ss.57 and 58, which can be overridden when treatment is required
urgently (s.62), apply to two categories of treatment: (a) the most serious treatments which require
the patient’s capacitated consent and a second opinion (s.57), and (b) other serious treatments
which require the patient’s capacitated consent or a second opinion (s.58). Where a second opinion
is required, this is provided by an independent second opinion appointed doctor (SOAD)
appointed for this purpose by the Mental Health Act Commission (MHAC). Treatments under
s.58 include the administration of medication for mental disorder after three months from its first
administration, as in B’s case. Before issuing a certificate authorising treatment, the SOAD must,
under s.58(3)(b), be satisfied that the treatment should be given to the patient ‘having regard to the
likelihood of its alleviating or preventing a deterioration of his condition’.
The provisions of s.58 might thus have seemed to provide unequivocal authority to treat even
capacitated patients without their consent. The enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA)
however, with its requirement (s.3(1)) that ‘so far as it is possible to do so’ statutory provisions be
exercised in a manner compatible with rights under the ECHR, offered a route for challenge in the
courts. A series of challenges to s.58 treatment, and therefore effectively to any compulsory
treatment under Part IV, then resulted. The first of these was R (Wilkinson) v RMO Broadmoor and
MHAC SOAD2 in which the Court of Appeal held that where a decision to administer medical
treatment to a patient without his consent under s.58(3)(b) was challenged by way of judicial review,
2 R (on the application of Wilkinson) v Responsible Medical Officer Broadmoor Hospital, the Mental Health Act
Commission Second Opinion Appointed Doctor and the Secretary of State for Health [2001] EWCA Civ 1545 
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the court was entitled to reach its own view on the facts as to whether the treatment infringed the
patient’s rights, through oral evidence and cross-examination if necessary. The Court also held,
obiter, that notwithstanding the statutory authority of Part IV MHA, when treatment was
imposed without consent upon a protesting patient, with or without capacity, this would be a
potential invasion of his Convention rights under Articles 3 or 8. Using the guidance of the
European Court (ECtHR) in Herczegfalvy v Austria3 though, a breach of these rights would be
avoided if the ‘therapeutic necessity’ or ‘medical necessity’ for the treatment had been
‘convincingly shown to exist’4.
The compatibility of the treatment provisions of Part IV with Articles 3 or 8 was then examined
more directly by the courts, firstly in R (N) v Dr M5 and subsequently in R (PS) v Dr G (RMO) and
Dr W (SOAD)6 7. 
In PS, Silber J8 ruled that the forcible administration of medication was lawful under s.58 MHA,
notwithstanding the patient’s capacity and refusal to consent. He confirmed however, that
administration of medication to a patient against his or her will would have the potential to
contravene Articles 3 and 8, but only in the following defined circumstances.
Article 3 would be engaged if the proposed treatment reached the minimum level of severity and
the medical necessity had not been convincingly shown to exist. Reaching the minimum level of
severity would normally involve intense physical or mental suffering9 and this would need to be
proved ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. To determine convincing medical necessity, the judge endorsed
the checklist of factors to be considered which had been set out by the Court of Appeal in N v Dr
M [para 19].
Compulsory treatment imposed on a non-consenting patient could often result in a prima facie
breach of Article 8, but this could be justified under Article 8(2). Such justification would have to
be based on the proposed treatment being ‘necessary in a democratic society... for the protection
of health’ and ‘in accordance with the law’. Silber J held that this latter phrase meant compliance
with the common law test of best interests, in that the treatment must be in accordance with
‘responsible and competent professional opinion’ and that the best available option for treatment
had been chosen10. This in turn meant that the proposed treatment was likely to alleviate or
prevent deterioration in the patient’s condition11, that a less invasive treatment which would be
likely to achieve the same beneficial result for the patient was not available, and that it was
necessary for the treatment to be given to the patient with regard to (a) his resistance to treatment,
(b) the degree to which treatment is likely to alleviate or prevent deterioration of his condition, (c)
3 Herczegfalvy v Austria (A/242B) (1993) 15 EHRR 437
at 484–485
4 In Herczegfalvy the ECtHR appeared to use the terms
‘medical necessity’ and ‘therapeutic necessity’
interchangeably
5 R (on the application of N) v Dr M and others [2002]
EWCA Civ 1789
6 R (on the application of PS) v Dr G (RMO) and Dr W
(SOAD) [2003] EWHC 2335 (Admin)
7 For a comprehensive review and analysis of this
judgment, see Bartlett, P. ‘Capacity, Treatment and
Human Rights’, Journal of Mental Health Law,
February 2004 pp 52–65 
8 Silber J had given the first instance judgment in R (N) v
Dr M and built on this in the PS case.
9 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at [52]
10 This two stage approach to the best interests test had
been laid down by Butler-Sloss P in Re S (Adult Patient:
Sterilisation) [2001] Fam 15 at 27–28 
11 This element follows the wording of the statutory test
under s.58(3)(b)
Paternalism or Power? – Compulsory treatment under section 58 of the Mental Health Act 1983
93
the risk he presents to himself, (d) the risk he presents to others, (e) the consequences of the
treatment not being given and (f) any possible adverse effects of the treatment12. 
This then was the clear legal framework regarding the imposition of treatment under Part IV MHA
at the time B’s first challenge came to the Administrative Court. 
The Decisions
(a) Administrative Court (1)13
The first challenge brought by B, against the Secretary of State, was effectively a challenge to the
judgment in PS, discussed above. His counsel, Paul Bowen14, argued that medical necessity alone
was insufficient justification for imposing treatment under s.58 on a competent patient who was
refusing treatment. Instead he asserted that:
(i) s.58(3)(b), when construed with the benefit of s.3 HRA, authorised compulsory treatment of
a capacitated patient against his will only where it was convincingly shown that such treatment
was both medically necessary (‘the medical necessity requirement’) and necessary to prevent
serious harm either to the public or to the patient’s health (‘the threshold requirement’); or
(ii) if s.58(3)(b) could not be construed in this way, a declaration of incompatibility under s.4
HRA should be considered.
Mr Bowen argued that his interpretation was supported by Articles 3, 8 and 14, and international
consensus.
Although Silber J refused B’s application, deeming it academic, he commented in some detail,
albeit obiter, on all the substantive points in the claim, essentially by following and developing his
own reasoning in PS. 
On Article 3 he held that this would not automatically be breached merely because the patient had
capacity to consent but did not do so; the ‘minimum level of severity’ would still need to be
demonstrated on the facts. He also held that the ruling in Herczegfalvy, that treatment which has
been convincingly shown to be medically necessary cannot infringe Article 3, applied equally to
capacitated patients. His conclusions on Article 3 were reinforced by his assertion that the
threshold of capacity for mental patients is not only low, but actually lower than for non-patients,
thus increasing the case for overriding the refusal of treatment by detained patients assessed as
having capacity. For this assertion he drew support from several sources, including the dicta of
Hale LJ in Wilkinson15, and the precise wording of s.58 MHA which suggested that the patient need
only be ‘capable of understanding the nature, purpose and likely effects of the treatment’, rather
than actually understanding these things. 
12 Silber J had developed this approach to the
determination of the single best option for treatment in
his first instance judgment in R (N) v Dr M and thus
imported it directly into PS. 
13 R (on the application of B) v Dr SS (1), Dr AC (2),
Secretary of State for the Department of Health (3)
[2005] EWHC 86 (Admin) 
14 Mr Bowen had also represented the claimant in
Wilkinson and appears to have refined and developed
the arguments used there, particularly in relation to
international consensus.
15 See Wilkinson, op.cit. at [80] per Hale LJ: “I do not take
the view that detained patients who have the capacity to
decide for themselves can never be treated against their
will. Our threshold of capacity is rightly a low one. It is
better to keep it that way and allow some non-consensual
treatment of those who have capacity than to set such a
high threshold for capacity that many would never
qualify.”
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On Article 8 he held, as in PS, that any breach of Article 8(1) could be justified under Article 8(2),
but now made it clear that ‘in accordance with the law’ meant consideration of both the common
law requirements of the ‘best interests test’, and the statutory requirements of s.58 MHA. 
Having rejected the Article 14 challenges on the basis that the chosen comparators were not in an
analogous situation to B, Silber J finally rejected Mr Bowen’s extensive representations on the
growing international consensus. Amongst other reasons, he held that none of the material was
binding on English courts nor, since none of it had been incorporated into English law, did it allow
a first instance judge to depart from established principles.
He concluded that in any event, the proposed imposition of treatment on B would not have
infringed his Convention rights, irrespective of his capacity.
(b) Administrative Court (2)16
In the second hearing in the Administrative Court, following the RMO’s decision that he now
wished, with the support of the SOAD, to pursue treatment under s.58(3)(b), the challenge was
made on different grounds; those issues which had been argued and had failed before Silber J were
reserved for appeal.
Before Charles J it was contended by B’s counsel, again Mr Bowen, that for the purposes of
Articles 3 and/or 8, the required threshold of ‘convincing medical necessity’ for the proposed
treatment had not been reached because (i) B had capacity to refuse treatment, and (ii) the evidence
did not convincingly establish that he was suffering from bi-polar affective disorder that was
relapsing.
The application was dismissed, with Charles J finding that the claimant lacked capacity and that the
proposed treatment had been convincingly shown as a medical necessity. In setting out the legal
framework for his decision, while substantially following the dicta of Silber J and earlier cases,
Charles J added some additional, and in some cases contradictory, insights of his own.
In assessing B’s capacity, he systematically applied the conventional three-stage test of Re C17. He
found that B was able to comprehend and retain information concerning his proposed treatment.
However, B’s refusal to believe that he was or might be mentally ill meant that he could not
effectively weigh in the balance the relevant information about the treatment in reaching a decision
as to whether to accept or refuse it. 
In respect of allegations of Article 3 breaches, the Court confirmed the authority of the
Herczegfalvy approach, and also that the proposed treatment would not amount to a breach merely
because a patient had capacity. Indeed B’s refusal of treatment and the effects of its compulsion
were regarded as more significant than the issue of whether he had capacity. Further it was
confirmed that in judicial review of potential Article 3 breaches, the court must determine for
itself whether medical necessity had been ‘convincingly shown’. In attempting to clarify the
meaning of this phrase, which had been recognised as a high standard of proof in N v Dr M18 [18]
but left undefined, Charles J reasoned that it must lie somewhere between the English criminal and
16 R (on the application of B) v S and others [2005]
EWHC 1936 (Admin)
17 Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1
All ER 819
18 See footnote 5 above
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civil standards. In B’s case, the Court held it unlikely that the compulsory administration of anti-
psychotic medication would result in a sufficient degree of severity to engage Article 3. In any
event, there were sound and compelling reasons to believe that the proposed treatment would
achieve many or all of its intended purposes, including alleviation of B’s symptoms and the
improvement of his chances of rehabilitation, and thus its therapeutic or medical necessity had
been convincingly shown. 
When considering justification for potential breaches of Article 8(1), the Court confirmed, as
already decided in PS19 and B v Dr SS20, that the Herczegfalvy test was not appropriate. Rather the
orthodox three-fold test under article 8(2) should be applied, namely: was the interference (i) ‘in
accordance with the law’, (ii) for a legitimate aim, and (iii) ‘necessary in a democratic society’.
Charles J held that ‘in accordance with the law’ required a consideration only of the statutory
provisions of Part IV MHA, and that Silber J had erred in holding that it also required an
application of the common law test of best interests. He suggested though, that in many cases there
would be no effective difference between an application of the statutory and the best interests tests.
In B’s case however, the parties had proceeded on the basis that if it had been convincingly shown
that the proposed treatment was a therapeutic or medical necessity, then all of the elements of
Article 8(2) would be satisfied and no alternative arguments would be advanced. Nevertheless for
completeness, Charles J added that the proposed treatment of B was a therapeutic or medical
necessity, that it satisfied the test in s.58 MHA, it was justified under Article 8(2) and it was in the
best interests of B.
Having dismissed the claim for judicial review on all grounds, the Court discharged the injunction
granted by Silber J preventing treatment, subject to a stay pending appeal.
(c) Court of Appeal21
Giving the reserved judgment of the Court, Lord Phillips CJ identified the five issues raised by the
appeal:
i) Was the judge wrong to find that B lacked capacity? If not:
ii) Should the appeal be dismissed without consideration of the other issues, on the ground that
these were academic? If not:
iii) Will compulsory treatment of a patient with capacity violate Articles 3, 8 and 14, or any of
them, unless it satisfies the ‘threshold requirement’ (i.e. that the treatment was necessary either
to prevent the patient causing harm to others or to protect the patient from serious harm)?
iv) Was the judge wrong to find that the proposed treatment constituted a medical or
therapeutic necessity?
v) What is the nature of the procedure that the court should follow when judicial review is
sought on Convention grounds of a decision to administer treatment under section 58?
On the first issue, the Court emphasised the importance which English law attached to the freedom
of the individual to decide what should or should not be done by way of physical interference or
invasion of the body. However the law also recognised exceptions to this principle, such as where
19 See footnote 6 above
20 See footnote 13 above
21 R (on the application of B) v S and others [2006]
EWCA Civ 28
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the patient lacked capacity to consent to such conduct. The particular position of mental patients
was provided for in the MHA. In the section in question, s.58, the relevant test of capacity seemed
to be laid down when it spoke of the patient being ‘capable of understanding the nature, purpose
and likely effects of’ the treatment. The Court recognised that these words may not go far enough
to define capacity and that in Wilkinson [66], it had been suggested that the Re MB22 test of capacity
used in relation to physical disorders was suitable for assessing capacity for the purposes of
s.58(3)(b). Without appearing to apply this test rigorously, the Court held that:
“Whatever the precise test of the capacity to consent to treatment, we think that it is plain that a
patient will lack that capacity if he is not able to appreciate the likely effects of having or not
having the treatment.”
After anxious scrutiny of the evidence, Charles J had found that this was the position in B’s case,
and had therefore been correct to conclude that he lacked capacity.
On the second issue, the Court held that even though B had been found to lack capacity to consent
to treatment, he may, with treatment, reach a state where his capacity was restored. The remaining
issues, relating to the lawfulness of the compulsory treatment of a capacitated patient, should
therefore be considered. 
In addressing the third issue, the Court first made some general observations. The Court suggested
that the submissions of B’s counsel, Mr Bowen, had implicitly been based on two premises, both
of which were unsound:
• The ‘threshold’ requirement had to be demonstrated at the stage when it is proposed to administer
treatment. The Court pointed out that at this point the patient would have been detained
and thus in a secure environment where his capacity for causing or experiencing harm was
inherently reduced. Anyway, the Court would show that this premise was at odds with the
scheme of the MHA
• Autonomy, and thus capacity, was of critical importance in deciding whether a particular
treatment could be imposed upon a detained patient. The Court observed that with the
fluctuating nature of B’s illness this premise could lead to an absurd scenario in which B
might regain capacity only with treatment, at which time he would be entitled to refuse
treatment and consequently relapse and lose capacity once more. Charles J had therefore
been correct to hold that capacity was not the critical factor in determining whether
treatment could be given without consent, and that the fact of its compulsion was more
significant.
The Court then explained that the MHA provided for an integral package of detention and
treatment, and imposed restrictions to ensure that individual treatment was justified. If the
detention of a patient for treatment pursuant to s.3 was justified on the ground that the treatment
was necessary for the protection of others, it was not logical to consider treatment in isolation
from the overall objective of the package, nor to apply a higher standard to justify the
administration of treatment itself. The Court cited approvingly the dicta of Baroness Hale in 
22 Re MB (An Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FCR 541
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R (B) v Ashworth Hospital Authority23, a case dealing with the scope of treatment permitted under
s.63 MHA:
“Once the state has taken away a person’s liberty and detained him in a hospital with a view to
medical treatment, the state should be able (some would say obliged) to provide him with the
treatment which he needs.” 
The Court also approved the observations of Silber J in PS,24 that the compulsory treatment of a
detained patient should be considered in the context of the likelihood that it would lead to the
patient’s rehabilitation and return to society. The objective of rehabilitation itself militated against
any approach which ignored the overall object of the MHA package and imposed a separate
‘threshold requirement’ on treatment.
Following these general observations, the Court then considered the compatibility of the express
provisions of the MHA with the ECHR. The leading authority was Herczegfalvy, in which the
ECtHR had held that a measure which was a therapeutic necessity cannot be regarded as inhuman
or degrading. The court nevertheless had to satisfy itself that the medical necessity had been
convincingly shown. Though this case related to a patient who lacked capacity, in the more recent
case of Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine25, the ECtHR had applied the same principles where the applicant
was not mentally ill. 
Moving to the fourth issue, the Court held that in the light of the findings of fact made by Charles
J, he had been entitled to conclude that the proposed treatment of B was in his best interests and
that it had been convincingly shown that it was a medical necessity. The Court did not feel it
necessary to decide whether these tests were the same, nor whether Charles J had been right to hold
that ‘in accordance with the law’ in Article 8(2) required consideration only of statutory provisions
and not the best interests test. The Court observed though, that the best interests test should not
be equated with that under s.58(3)(b) which was much narrower, but suggested that common law
and medical ethics should ensure that SOADs would always apply it anyway before authorising
treatment. 
In addressing the final issue, the Court acknowledged the principle established in Wilkinson that in
judicial review proceedings of human rights challenges to compulsory treatment under s.58, the
claimant was entitled to require the attendance of medical witnesses to give evidence and be cross-
examined. The Court noted though, that both in Wilkinson [62] and N v Dr M [36], there had been
observations that cross-examination of medical witnesses should be ordered only if necessary. The
Court reflected that it was undesirable that medical practitioners should have to attend court as
witnesses rather than attend to their patients, and suggested that if s.58, which imposed clear
preconditions for compulsory treatment, was properly complied with, then issues requiring cross-
examination of medical witnesses should not often arise. This would require that the SOAD
should give a truly independent assessment and not merely approval of the RMO’s decision on the
basis that it was not manifestly unsound.
Having thus dealt with all the issues raised, the Court duly dismissed the appeal. 
23 R (on the application of B) v Ashworth Hospital
Authority [2005] UKHL 20 at [31]. See Kris
Gledhill’s consideration of this case: ‘The House of
Lords and the Unimportance of Classification: A
Retrograde Step’; JMHL November 2005, pp 174–185
24 See PS, op.cit. at [134]
25 Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine; Application No. 54825/00 
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Discussion
While the Court of Appeal may have determined the appeal, the judgment seemed to contain little
new law. Somewhat disappointingly, it also failed to clarify or resolve a number of the undecided
points or apparent contradictions in earlier judgments, particularly in the following areas.
(a) Capacity
The capacity of psychiatric patients remains problematic both in terms of its assessment and its
significance. 
The assertion of Silber J in the Administrative Court that the threshold of capacity for mental
patients is not only low, but actually lower than for non-patients, surely cannot be correct. His use
of the dicta of Hale LJ in Wilkinson [80] to support his assertion would seem to be a
misrepresentation of her Ladyship’s comments, since she did not appear to be talking specifically
about mental patients, but more generally when she said: ‘Our threshold of capacity is rightly a low
one’. Indeed, even this is debatable for, as Bartlett26 has observed, ‘the threshold of capacity in
England is not low at all...it is exceptionally high’. And Silber J’s reference to the wording of s.58
to infer that the test of capacity of detained patients requires only capability to understand rather
than actual understanding, seems at total variance with current practice. The MHAC has long held
that SOADs should require both capacity and actual understanding of the treatment and its
consequences – a view endorsed by Jones27, who advises that the common law test of Re MB
should be applied. The MHAC28 has now specifically expressed concerns about Silber J’s
comments, and emphasised that different legal criteria should not be applied to the determination
of capacity in detained patients and others. But in not addressing this element of Silber J’s
judgment, and also in itself not seeming inclined to apply the Re MB test rigorously, the Court of
Appeal has allowed uncertainty about assessment of the capacity of psychiatric patients to
continue. 
On the significance of capacity though, the Court was crystal clear that it is not determinative of
the authority to impose treatment under s.58, even where nobody is at risk from serious harm.
Their reasoning merits closer scrutiny however. The Court aligned itself with the recent judgment
in R(B) v Ashworth Hospital Authority29 in believing that the MHA provided a package in which the
authority for detention essentially provided the necessary authority for compulsory treatment – it
was illogical to apply a higher standard to justify the administration of treatment itself. Yet
deprivation of liberty is a quite different matter than violation of the person. As Gledhill30 has
commented, this type of reasoning comes close to implying that the loss of liberty due to mental
disorder carries with it a consequent loss of any right of self-determination. Bartlett31 has pointed
out that there are jurisdictions where no patient with capacity, even a detained psychiatric patient,
may be treated without his informed consent. In these jurisdictions, detained capacitated patients
26 Bartlett, P. ‘The Test of Compulsion in Mental Health
Law: Capacity, Therapeutic Benefit and Dangerousness
as Possible Criteria’, Medical Law Review 2003 11(3)
pp 326–352 at p 335
27 Jones, R.M. ‘Mental Health Act Manual’, 9th Edition,
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004 at paras 1-713 and 1-
714
28 Mental Health Act Commission, ‘Eleventh Biennial
Report 2003–2005: “In Place of Fear?”’, London,
TSO, 2005 at paras 1.56–1.59
29 See footnote 23 above
30 Gledhill, K. ‘The House of Lords and the
Unimportance of Classification: A Retrograde Step’,
Journal of Mental Health Law, November 2005, pp
174–185 at p 184 
31 See Bartlett (2003), op.cit. at pp 333–334
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apparently rarely refuse treatment, but rather tend to negotiate a mutually acceptable treatment
solution with their psychiatrists. Despite the strenuous advocacy of lawyers like Mr Bowen
however, the capacity of detained psychiatric patients has not reached this level of significance in
the domestic jurisdiction. Nor is it likely to achieve any greater significance in future mental health
legislation. For while the Richardson Committee32, in developing proposals for reform of the
MHA, had suggested that treatment be imposed on those with capacity only where this was
necessary to prevent a substantial risk of serious harm to the patient or other persons33, this
recommendation was not incorporated in the White Paper34 nor subsequent drafts of the now
aborted Mental Health Bill35 36. Nor does it appear to be included anywhere within the
Government’s subsequent proposals for amendments to the MHA. 
(b) Best Interests and the Role of the SOAD
It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeal failed to clarify the status of the best interests test within
Article 8(2) for, as Fennell37 had much earlier pointed out, the legal test under s.58(3)(b) of
likelihood that the treatment will alleviate or prevent deterioration, is very much looser than the
best interests test. It had been further diluted by DHSS guidelines38 so as to require SOADs
effectively to apply only the Bolam39 criteria of reasonableness rather than seek the best treatment
option for the patient. That this had in fact been their approach, Fennell inferred, was evidenced
by the consistently high level of agreement between RMOs and SOADs.
Since then, in Wilkinson40, the judiciary have criticised the operation of the SOAD role as an
effective safeguard for patients, regarding it as too much a review of the RMO’s proposal and
assessment of its reasonableness, albeit that this was in line with the then current MHAC
guidelines41. Rather the SOAD was expected to exercise his own independent view of the
desirability and propriety of treatment, and demonstrate a less deferential approach than appeared
to be the norm. Despite this, the high level of agreement between RMOs and SOADs has
continued to the present42. The MHAC has suggested, without evidence, that this attests to the
success of the second opinion process and the care with which RMOs prepare their treatment
plans.
Yet, in terms redolent of those used in Wilkinson, the Court of Appeal has again urged SOADs to
conduct a truly independent assessment. On the other hand, it has also assumed that SOADs
32 Department of Health, ‘Review of the Mental Health
Act 1983: Report of the Expert Committee’, (The
Richardson Report), London, DoH, November 1999 at
paras 5.94–5.97
33 This, of course, had been precisely the basis of Mr
Bowen’s submissions in B v Dr SS 
34 Reforming the Mental Health Act – Part 1: The new
legal framework, Cm 5016-I, Department of Health,
London, TSO, December 2000
35 Draft Mental Health Bill, Cm 5538-I Department of
Health, London, TSO, June 2002
36 Draft Mental Health Bill, Cm 6305-I Department of
Health, London, TSO, September 2004
37 Fennell, P. ‘Treatment Without Consent: Law,
Psychiatry and the Treatment of Mentally Disordered
People since 1845’, London, Routledge, 1996 at pp 204
and 208
38 Department of Health and Social Security, Dear Doctor
Letter DDL 84(4), DHSS, 1984
39 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee
[1957] 2 All ER 118
40 See Wilkinson, op.cit. at [32]-[33] and [71]
41 Mental Health Act Commission, ‘Advice to Second
Opinion Appointed Doctors’, Nottingham, MHAC,
April 1999 at para 11
42 Mental Health Act Commission, ‘Tenth Biennial
Report 2001–2003: “Placed amongst strangers”’,
London, TSO, 2003 at para 10.37 and MHAC
Eleventh Biennial Report, op.cit. at para 4.67. The
number of second opinions where a significant change
had been made to the RMO’s treatment plan has in fact
remained essentially static at about 2–3% of the total
for over a decade.
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would anyway not be certifying treatment under s.58 unless satisfied that it was in the patient’s best
interests.
The judiciary really cannot have it both ways. If the SOAD’s role as a safeguard for patients is
operating effectively, such exhortations to independent judgment are unnecessary. If it is not, as
the Court of Appeal inferred, and as the MHAC statistics might more probably suggest, then the
Court has lost an opportunity to reinforce it by enshrining the best interest tests, with its
associated requirement to seek the best possible treatment option, firmly within the meaning of ‘in
accordance with the law’ in Article 8(2). While it is acknowledged that this test was developed
within the common law principles of treatment of those without capacity, it is submitted that it
should be equally applicable in the context of capacitated patients where their capacity is to be
overridden and treatment decisions are to be made on their behalf, and imposed without their
consent, under s.58(3)(b). 
(c) Role of the Court
Wilkinson had established the principle that in judicial review proceedings of human rights
challenges to compulsory treatment under s.58, the court must reach its own view on the facts. The
observations of Hale LJ in that case, that cross-examination of medical witnesses should be ordered
only if necessary, have since been cited and interpreted by the Court of Appeal in both N v Dr M
[39] and the instant case [68] to suggest that the need for oral evidence and cross-examination in such
cases would be exceptional. The lower courts have been somewhat more inclined to accept the
benefits of such evidence. Silber J found it essential in PS [23], and Charles J43 in his judgment in
the Administrative Court specifically observed that, contrary to N v Dr M, cross-examination of
medical witnesses would be helpful and informative in many cases. However, Collins J only
reluctantly accepted the need to move beyond the court’s normal review obligations in R (B) v
Haddock44, and in R (Taylor) v Haydn-Smith45 he declined applications for oral evidence. (Both of
these were s.58 challenges.)
As Bartlett46 noted when commenting on the PS case though, even where the court has allowed oral
evidence, there has been a tendency to deal with it in the manner of traditional judicial review,
based more on assessment of witness credibility rather than the substantive engagement with the
facts required by Wilkinson. And in respect of witness credibility, we should also note the inherent
deference of the courts to the treating physicians. This has its origins in the dicta of Simon Brown
LJ in Wilkinson [31]:
“Certainly, however, courts will not be astute to overrule a treatment plan decided upon by the
RMO and certified by a SOAD following consultation with two other persons.”
This view was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in N v Dr M47, and has since been echoed by Silber
J in PS [82] and by Charles J in the Administrative Court in the instant case [68]–[70]. 
The Court of Appeal appeared to acknowledge the ambivalence of the judiciary concerning their
43 See B v S (HC), op.cit. at [235]-[236]
44 R (on the application of B) v Haddock and others
[2005] EWHC 921 (Admin) at [15]. As acknowledged
later on in the text, this case has subsequently been
considered by the Court of Appeal.
45 R (on the application of Taylor) v Haydn-Smith and
another [2005] EWHC 1668 at [8]
46 See Bartlett (2004), op.cit. at pp 57–58
47 See N v Dr M, op.cit. at [38] per Dyson LJ: “Courts are
likely to pay very particular regard to the views held by
those specifically charged with the patient’s care.”
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approach to hearings of treatment challenges and admission of oral evidence, though
unfortunately its own comments were not conclusive, and it specifically declined to comment on
the observations of the first instance judges in the case. Nevertheless the inference of the Court’s
comments regarding both oral evidence and the status of the treating physicians, would clearly
suggest that its position aligns with that of the appellate court in Wilkinson and N v Dr M. All this
inevitably implies that in such judicial review proceedings, the odds will remain stacked against the
claimant, since he can have little confidence that his own medical evidence will receive either
adequate or impartial consideration.
More recently though, the judiciary were given a further opportunity to consider, inter alia, the
nature and intensity of the review to be carried out by the court in such cases, when B v Haddock48
was heard by the Court of Appeal. Their judgment has really done nothing to rebalance the odds,
however. On the issue of oral evidence and cross-examination, the Court endorsed the view of the
Court in the instant case in perceiving no inconsistency of approach between the decisions in
Wilkinson and N v Dr M, and held that the Court in Wilkinson could never have intended or
contemplated that every such case would require the hearing and testing of medical evidence [65].
And again the Court approvingly noted the dicta of earlier judgments regarding the particular
deference to be shown by the courts to the views of treating physicians [14].
Conclusion
Contrary to what might have been anticipated, previous challenges under the HRA had afforded
detained psychiatric patients no substantive rights in respect of their treatment – only some
modest procedural protection. The judgment of the Court of Appeal in this case should therefore
have come as no surprise. In its reasoning, it follows the earlier s.58 judgments. In its tone however,
it aligns closely with the recent judgment of the House of Lords in B v Ashworth. In summary, the
courts have now made it very clear that, provided due process is observed, the HRA will provide
no impediment to the exercise of the wide-ranging powers of compulsory treatment under Part IV
MHA, even where the patient has capacity and irrespective of whether refusal of treatment poses
a risk of serious harm to the patient or others. The courts have shown little inclination to limit
these powers and, though perhaps a topic for a different article, it might be argued that they have
even sought to broaden them beyond the legislative intent. It would be of some comfort to think
that the judiciary have been motivated by paternalism – true concern for the patients. It is hard to
avoid the conclusion though, that it has become more an issue of power – and that it is much more
convenient for everyone when the balance of power is left firmly in the grasp of the authorities. 
48 R (on the application of JB) v Haddock and others [2006] EWCA Civ 961
